On July 2nd, local time, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani officially suspended cooperation between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency. This means that Iran will no longer accept international inspections related to nuclear non-proliferation, leaving the international community in the dark about the actual damage sustained by Iran’s nuclear facilities during the “12th War.”
During an interview with American media on the same day, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian stated that the Tehran’s Foroduh nuclear facility, which produces synthetic high-enriched uranium, had been “significantly damaged” by the previous bombing by U.S. forces. This differs from the official description of Iran but aligns closely with a statement made by U.S. Department of Defense spokesperson Patrick Shanahan on July 2nd: The U.S. believes that Iran’s nuclear program has been “delayed by approximately one to two years.”
However, are these statements fact or smokescreen? Frank Von Hippel, a renowned nuclear non-proliferation expert, professor at Princeton University, and member of the American Physical Society, in an interview with China Newsweek, offered a completely opposite assessment: The U.S. and Israel’s attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities have not destroyed the high-enriched uranium materials needed for making nuclear weapons; if Iran were determined, it could produce nuclear weapons within one to three weeks.
Many analysts believe that the continuous release of information by the U.S. claiming that Iran’s “nuclear capabilities have been destroyed” is aimed at fulfilling President Trump’s declared “victory”; while Iran’s information is partly to cover up its real nuclear plans and partly to avoid renewed conflicts. In recent interviews with the media, Trump stated that he would “without question” retaliate against Iran again if intelligence agencies determine that Iran can still push uranium enrichment to a “worrying level.”
As an important participant in the negotiations on the nuclear issue, Von Hippel also told China Newsweek that according to his knowledge, Iran has never actually planned to make nuclear weapons. “Until the war before June 13th, Iran believed that as long as they had the capability to synthesize high-enriched uranium, they would be sufficiently deterrent.”
However, it is clear that this deterrence did not prevent the bombing of Iran by the nuclear-armed states of the United States and Israel. So, I am now uncertain whether Iran feels compelled to possess actual nuclear weapons.”
Hirpeer is the world’s most experienced expert on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, having served as Assistant Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and currently holds the position of Senior Physics Fellow at Princeton University and Honorary Professor in the Science and Global Security Program. He also serves as co-chair of the International Fusion Materials Facility (IPFM), a group of nuclear experts from China, the US, and other countries. He has been deeply involved in negotiations to end the nuclear arms race between the US and the Soviet Union and has made key recommendations during various rounds of the Iran nuclear issue negotiations, which were adopted by representatives from both sides.
“Destroying High-Concentration Uranium Stockpiles Is Different,”
China Newsweek: Since the ceasefire between Israel and Iran on the “12th War,” there are differing opinions on whether the US and Israel have destroyed Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Trump insists that the Fordo nuclear facility in Iran has been “completely destroyed,” and the International Atomic Energy Agency also believes that centrifuges within the Fordo facility have stopped operating. Does this mean Iran’s nuclear capabilities have been significantly weakened?
Whether the centrifuges at Fordo have been destroyed or whether the hall where they are located was directly hit and collapsed until a hand-held inspection report comes out, the outside world will not know until then. Currently, the International Atomic Energy Agency does not know more about Fordo than we do because they have not yet entered the facility.
But a reasonable guess is that the most likely damage these centrifuges would suffer is from shock caused by ground-penetrating bombs (shock), with the extent of damage depending on whether the centrifuges were operational at the time. If they were not operating, it would be difficult for them to be truly damaged unless ground-penetrating bombs struck the underground hall directly.
Moreover, although we do not have exact information, it is likely that before the airstrikes arrived, Iran had transferred 60% of their previously produced high-enriched uranium from the Forodus and Isfahan nuclear facilities. This issue is more significant than whether the centrifuges at Forodus were severely damaged. As long as these high-enriched uranium stocks are still available, Iran can produce nuclear weapons.
Currently, the International Atomic Energy Agency states that the high-enriched uranium was transferred before the airstrikes. High-enriched uranium is typically stored in gaseous form in cylinders, which can be returned to centrifuges for further enrichment. Iran currently possesses over 400 kilograms of high-enriched uranium, considering storage methods, totaling over 500 kilograms of material, which is easily transportable by vehicles.
Of course, Israel’s impressive intelligence capabilities during this war demonstrate that they have sufficient influence over Iran to know the locations of high-enriched uranium storage, enabling precise strikes. However, due to Iran’s nuclear facilities being continuously threatened by Israel in terms of intelligence and air strikes, high-enriched uranium has been scattered across multiple locations, with many specific details remaining uncertain to insiders.
Therefore, even if Israel might have penetrated into Iran’s nuclear program, we cannot rule out the possibility that Iran might have secret high-enriched uranium storage sites, or even potentially secret nuclear facilities with a few centrifuges. The location of these facilities is only known to a very small number of individuals within the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization.
“China Newsweek”: Does this mean that even if the “maximum effect” of the U.S. and Israel’s strikes on Iran is achieved, it would only leave most of Iran’s existing centrifuges unable to operate in the coming months, preventing them from producing more high-enriched uranium? Yet, Iran could still have enough high-enriched uranium stockpiles to directly produce nuclear weapons in a short time?
Yes, attacking centrifuges and destroying high-enriched uranium stockpiles are two separate issues. Now, with only a small amount of enrichment work, Iran’s existing 60% high-enriched uranium can be converted into 90% weapon-grade enriched uranium. If Iran is eager for deterrence, 60% enriched uranium could actually be used to manufacture nuclear weapons, though each warhead would require more enriched uranium material. If Iran simply wants to produce a missile, it is possible.
So, how long does it take Iran to manufacture nuclear weapons? The main factor depends on how much preparation Iran has made in other areas, especially in the design of the nuclear bomb’s detonation mechanism. If these preparations are complete, converting hexafluorouraney (HFTU) into high-enriched uranium metal compounds for nuclear bomb components only takes 1 to 3 weeks. Then, Iran possesses nuclear weapons.
On June 21st, U.S. President Donald Trump (center) delivered a national address regarding the strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Photo/IC
“Trump’s impulsiveness has put us in danger”
China Newsweek: If Trump realizes that Iran still possesses high-enriched uranium stockpiles, could he possibly launch another airstrike against Iran?
It’s hard to say. Israel is likely to push him to do so, and Israeli intelligence about Iranian nuclear facilities might also be more extensive than what the Americans have. As for Trump, he lives in his own “reality,” needing things politically advantageous for him. I don’t think he has much interest in Iran; it’s merely a stage for a performance. If this stage can make him appear “successful,” he will try to do something.
China Newsweek: After the ceasefire, the window for resolving the nuclear issue with Iran through diplomatic means has passed, or has it reopened?
The window remains open, and everything is possible. The real question is, to what extent has the US-Israel attack on Iran strengthened Iran’s motivation to pursue nuclear weapons.
As far as I know, before this war, the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, did not really want nuclear weapons because it contradicted his teachings (note: since the 1990s, Khamenei has repeatedly issued decrees prohibiting the acquisition of nuclear weapons). However, he wanted sufficient nuclear deterrence over Israel and the United States. Before the war, Iran believed that as long as they had the capability to produce synthetic high-enriched uranium, they would be sufficiently deterred, as it meant they could produce nuclear weapons.
Now, it’s clear that this deterrence did not prevent the bombings of Iran by the United States and Israel, two nuclear-armed countries. So, I am now uncertain whether Iran feels that they must possess actual nuclear weapons to have sufficient deterrence. Moreover, whether future Iranian decision-makers will still believe that possessing nuclear weapons is against religious law is also hard to say.
Trump is also a factor of uncertainty. I think the U.S. government negotiation team needs more expertise in foreign affairs and nuclear issues. Now, Trump is merely imagining that he and his real estate developer friend (President of the Middle East Envoy for the U.S.) can accomplish anything. This is a disrespect for professional knowledge. Such actions by a president that undermine government capabilities are rare in American history.
“China Newsweek”: We have seen many reversals in the Iran nuclear negotiations since February, such as initially agreeing to allow Iran to synthesize low-enriched uranium, but then proposing a “zero-enriched uranium” scheme that is more stringent than the conditions of the Obama era nuclear negotiations. Do you think they sought professional advice?
As far as I know, they have been discussing the introduction of a technical team to negotiate details. But the issue you raised isn’t technical; it’s about Trump. Trump often acts impulsively in nuclear negotiations. As long as he is president, we will find ourselves in great danger on many issues.
“China Newsweek”: Reports suggest that the US team has proposed a concession for Iran to accept “zero-enriched uranium,” such as allowing Iran to import enriched uranium from abroad for nuclear energy development. This essentially is the solution you have proposed for the nuclear issue—forming a regional alliance or company where Iran does not conduct uranium enrichment but can obtain enriched uranium. Will Iran accept this condition?
Our latest proposal is that Iran refrains from any uranium enrichment activities, but can produce centrifuges. In other words, Iran can retain the capability to synthesize enriched uranium through producing centrifuges, which means it retains the potential to possess nuclear weapons; however, it will only import enriched uranium from abroad for actual use of nuclear energy. This is a relatively economical solution, and Iran itself is also purchasing enriched uranium from abroad for its nuclear power plants.
The tricky part of this proposal is that the outside world must be able to track the status of Iran’s centrifuges effectively, ensuring surveillance over all centrifuges. There are always concerns about Iran secretly enriching uranium, but the problem lies in the fact that manufacturing centrifuges is not difficult for Iran and cannot completely eliminate its potential to manufacture nuclear weapons.
In fact, more and more countries around the world are now producing their own centrifuges. This is an excess, uneconomical in terms of nuclear energy utilization, but it signifies the potential to manufacture nuclear weapons.
We must take this extremely dangerous trend seriously, with the fundamental issue being inequality. For instance, now, Iran might withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which would certainly raise controversy, but Iran could say: I am attacked by two nuclear-armed states, and these states have become “invincible” by possessing nuclear weapons. So, we Iranians must also possess nuclear deterrence capabilities.
There’s a joke about nuclear non-proliferation: “We tell people to drink water, but we’re drinking whiskey.”
“We should prevent any country from acquiring nuclear weapons, but at the same time, nuclear-armed countries must fulfill their commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. They must recognize that nuclear war is unwinnable and cannot be fought.”
“China Newsweek”: It seems that the Iranian nuclear issue will not be resolved in the foreseeable future, as Iran will undoubtedly maintain its potential nuclear deterrent. Trump and Israel aim to completely strip Iran of its capabilities. It’s hard for both sides to reach a consensus.
To some extent, this is true, especially if the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps continues to wield significant influence in Iran’s political landscape, they would be more resolute after the war in advocating that Iran has no other choice but to acquire nuclear weapons.
However, I believe that Iran’s longstanding interest has always been in having “nuclear weapon options” as a defensive measure rather than actual nuclear weapons. So we might enter a gradual process whereby the United States lifts sanctions in exchange for Iran dismantling 60% of its existing high-enriched uranium, and then limiting Iran’s nuclear capabilities to a state where it takes “a very long time to produce high-enriched uranium.” This is the approach outlined in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, where Iran agrees to maintain a distance of 12 months from producing nuclear weapons while all parties comply with the agreement.
“China Newsweek”: You have had many interactions with Iranian colleagues, do they still trust the United States?
Of course, they don’t trust the United States. But the nuclear deal was never based on trust. As we just mentioned, the previous nuclear deal attempted to create a balance. Iranians could say, “If necessary, we can obtain nuclear weapons within 12 months.” The United States could respond, “If they start trying to obtain nuclear weapons, we will have 12 months to stop them.”
This balance is neither pleasant nor easy to achieve, but it represents a mutual compromise.
In the ideal scenario, as Iran further integrates into global economic cooperation, its demand for nuclear weapons would decrease, potentially leading to their eventual disappearance. Unfortunately, that moment has yet to arrive.
Published on July 7, 2025, in Issue 1194 of China Newsweek magazine.
Hippel: Will Trump strike again against Iran?