On July 2nd, local time, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani officially suspended cooperation between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency. This means that Iran no longer accepts international inspections related to nuclear non-proliferation, leaving the international community in the dark about the actual damage sustained by Iran’s nuclear facilities during the “12th War.”
During an interview with American media on the same day, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian stated that the Tehran’s Forodus nuclear facility, which produces synthetic high-enriched uranium, had been “seriously damaged” by the previous bombing by U.S. forces. This differs from the official description of Iran but is close to a statement made by U.S. Department of Defense spokesperson Patrick Shanahan on July 2nd: The U.S. believes that Iran’s nuclear program has been “delayed for about 1 to 2 years.”
However, are these statements fact or smokescreen? Frank Von Hippel, a renowned nuclear non-proliferation expert, professor at Princeton University, and Fellow of the American Physical Society, in an interview with China Newsweek, offered a completely opposite assessment: The U.S. and Israel’s attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities have not destroyed the high-enriched uranium materials needed to produce nuclear weapons; if Iran were determined, it could produce nuclear weapons within 1 to 3 weeks.
Many analysts believe that the continuous release of information by the U.S. about the destruction of Iran’s “nuclear capabilities” is aimed at fulfilling President Trump’s declared “victory”; while Iran’s information is partly to cover up its real nuclear plans and partly to avoid a resurgence of war. In recent interviews with the media, Trump stated that he would “without question” retaliate with air strikes against Iran again if intelligence agencies determine that Iran can still enrich uranium to a “worrisome level.”
As an important participant in the negotiations on the nuclear issue, Von Hippel also told China Newsweek that according to his knowledge, Iran has never actually planned to produce nuclear weapons. “Until the war on June 13th, Iran always believed that as long as they had the capability to synthesize high-enriched uranium, they would be sufficiently deterrent.”
But it’s clear that this deterrence has not prevented the bombing of Iran by the nuclear-armed states of the United States and Israel. So, I am now uncertain whether Iran feels compelled to possess actual nuclear weapons.”
Hirsch is the world’s most senior expert on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, having served as Assistant Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and currently holds a distinguished position as a Senior Physics Scientist and Honorary Professor at Princeton University, where he also serves as co-chair of the International Fusion Materials Facility (IPFM) with China and other 17 countries. He has been deeply involved in the negotiations leading to the end of the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union and has made key recommendations during various rounds of the Iran nuclear issue negotiations, which have been adopted by representatives from both sides.
“Destroying High-Concentration Uranium Stockpiles Is Different,”
China Newsweek: Since the ceasefire between Israel and Iran on the “12th War,” opinions differ on whether the United States and Israel have destroyed Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Trump insists that the Fordo nuclear facility in Iran has been “completely destroyed,” and the International Atomic Energy Agency also believes that centrifuges within the Fordo facility have stopped operating. Does this mean Iran’s nuclear capabilities have been significantly weakened?
Whether the centrifuges at Fordo have been destroyed or whether the hall where they are placed has been directly hit and collapsed until a hand-checked report comes out, the outside world will not know until then. Currently, the International Atomic Energy Agency does not know more about Fordo than we do because they have not yet entered the facility.
But a reasonable guess is that the most likely damage these centrifuges would suffer is from shock caused by ground-penetrating bombs (shock), depending on whether the centrifuges were operating at the time. If they were not operating, it would be difficult for them to be truly damaged unless the ground-penetrating bomb directly struck the underground hall.
Moreover, although we do not have exact information, it is likely that before the airstrikes, Iran had already transferred 60% of their previously produced high-enriched uranium from the Forodus and Isfahan nuclear facilities. This issue is more significant than whether the centrifuges at Forodus were severely damaged. As long as these high-enriched uranium stocks are still available, Iran can produce nuclear weapons.
Currently, the International Atomic Energy Agency states that they were informed that the high-enriched uranium was transferred before the airstrikes. High-enriched uranium is typically stored in gaseous form in cylinders, which can be returned to the centrifuge for further enrichment. Iran currently possesses over 400 kilograms of high-enriched uranium, considering storage methods, totaling over 500 kilograms of material, which is easily transportable by vehicles.
Of course, Israel’s impressive intelligence capabilities during this war demonstrate that they have sufficient influence over Iran to know the locations of the high-enriched uranium storage, enabling precise strikes. However, due to Iran’s nuclear facilities being continuously threatened by Israel in terms of intelligence and airstrikes, the high-enriched uranium has been scattered across multiple locations, with many specific details remaining uncertain to insiders.
Therefore, even if Israel might have penetrated into Iran’s nuclear program, we cannot rule out the possibility that Iran might have secret high-enriched uranium storage sites, or even potentially secret nuclear facilities with a few centrifuges. The location of these facilities is only known to a very small number of individuals within the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization.
“China Newsweek”: Does this mean that even if the “maximum effect” of the US and Israel’s strikes could only make most of Iran’s existing centrifuges inoperable for the next few months, preventing them from producing more high-enriched uranium, Iran could still have enough high-enriched uranium stockpiles to directly produce nuclear weapons in a short period?
Yes, attacking centrifuges and destroying high-enriched uranium stockpiles are two separate matters. Now, with just a small amount of enrichment work, Iran’s existing 60% high-enriched uranium can be converted into 90% weapon-grade enriched uranium. If Iran is eager for deterrence, the 60% enriched uranium actually could be used to manufacture nuclear weapons, though each warhead would require more enriched uranium material. If Iran simply wants to produce a missile, it is possible.
So, how long does it take Iran to manufacture nuclear weapons? The main factor depends on how much preparation Iran has made in other areas, especially in terms of the design of the nuclear bomb’s detonation. If these preparations are complete, then converting hexafluorouracil into high-enriched uranium metal compounds for nuclear bomb components only takes 1 to 3 weeks. Then, Iran possesses nuclear weapons.
On June 21st, U.S. President Donald Trump (center) delivered a national address regarding the strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Photo/IC
“Trump’s impulsiveness has put us in danger”
China Newsweek: If Trump realizes that Iran still possesses high-enriched uranium stockpiles, could he possibly launch another airstrike against Iran?
It’s hard to say. Israel is likely to push him to do so, and Israeli intelligence about Iran’s nuclear facilities might also be more extensive than what the Americans have. As for Trump, he lives in his own “reality,” needing things politically advantageous for him. I don’t think he has much interest in Iran; it’s merely a stage for him to perform. If this stage can make him appear “successful,” he will try to do something.
China Newsweek: After the ceasefire, the window for resolving the nuclear issue through diplomatic means has passed, or has it reopened?
The window remains open, and everything is possible. The real question is, to what extent has the US-Israel attack on Iran strengthened Iran’s motivation to pursue nuclear weapons.
As far as I know, before this war, the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, did not really want nuclear weapons because it contradicted his teachings (note: since the 1990s, Khamenei has repeatedly issued decrees prohibiting the acquisition of nuclear weapons). However, he wanted sufficient nuclear deterrence over Israel and the United States. Before the war, Iran believed that as long as they had the capability to produce synthetic high-enriched uranium, they would be sufficiently deterred, as it meant they could produce nuclear weapons.
Now, it is clear that this deterrence did not prevent the bombings of Iran by the United States and Israel, two nuclear-armed countries. So, I am now uncertain whether Iran feels that they must possess actual nuclear weapons to have sufficient deterrence. Moreover, whether future Iranian decision-makers will still consider possessing nuclear weapons against the teachings of Islam is also hard to say.
Trump is also a factor of uncertainty. I believe that the U.S. government’s negotiation team needs more expertise in foreign affairs and nuclear issues. Now, Trump is merely imagining that he and his real estate developer friend (President of the Middle East Envoy for the U.S.) can accomplish anything. This is a disrespect for professional knowledge. Such actions by a president to undermine government capabilities are rare in American history.
“China Newsweek”: We have seen many reversals in the U.S. negotiation team’s nuclear talks since February, such as agreeing to allow Iran to synthesize low-enriched uranium but then proposing a “zero-enriched uranium” scheme with harsher conditions than those during Obama’s nuclear negotiations. Do you think they sought professional advice?
As far as I know, they have been discussing the introduction of technical teams to negotiate details. But the issue you raised isn’t technical; it’s about Trump. Trump often acts impulsively in nuclear negotiations. As long as he is president, we will face great dangers on many issues.
“China Newsweek”: Reports have suggested that the US team is now proposing a concession for Iran to accept “zero-enriched uranium,” such as allowing Iran to import enriched uranium from abroad for nuclear energy development. This essentially represents the solution you proposed for the nuclear issue—establishing a regional alliance or company where Iran does not conduct uranium enrichment itself but can obtain enriched uranium. Will Iran accept this condition?
Our latest proposal is that Iran refrains from any uranium enrichment activities, but it can produce centrifuges. In other words, Iran can retain the capability to synthesize enriched uranium through producing centrifuges, which means it can maintain its potential to possess nuclear weapons; however, it will only import enriched uranium from abroad for actual nuclear energy use. This is a relatively economical solution, and Iran is also purchasing enriched uranium from abroad for its nuclear power plants.
The tricky part of this proposal is that external parties must be able to track the condition of Iran’s centrifuges effectively, ensuring surveillance over all centrifuges. There are always concerns about Iran secretly enriching uranium, but the problem lies in the fact that manufacturing centrifuges is not difficult for Iran and cannot completely eliminate its potential to manufacture nuclear weapons.
In fact, more and more countries around the world are now producing their own centrifuges. This is an excess, uneconomical in terms of nuclear energy utilization, but it signifies the potential for manufacturing nuclear weapons.
We must take this extremely dangerous trend seriously, with the fundamental issue being inequality. For instance, currently, Iran might even consider withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which would certainly raise controversy, but Iran could argue: I am attacked by two nuclear-armed states, and these states have become “invincible” by possessing nuclear weapons. Therefore, we Iranians must also possess nuclear deterrence capabilities.
There’s a joke about nuclear non-proliferation: “We tell people to drink water, but we’re drinking whiskey.”
“We should prevent any country from acquiring nuclear weapons, but at the same time, nuclear-armed countries must fulfill their commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. They must realize that nuclear war is unwinnable and cannot be won.”
“China Newsweek”: It seems that the issue of Iran’s nuclear program will not be resolved in the near future because Iran will undoubtedly maintain its potential for nuclear deterrence. Trump and Israel aim to completely strip Iran of its capabilities. It’s hard for both sides to reach a consensus.
To some extent, this is true, especially if the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps continues to wield significant influence in Iranian politics, they would be more determined after the war to argue that Iran has no choice but to acquire nuclear weapons.
However, I believe that Iran’s longstanding interest has always been in having “nuclear weapon options” as a defensive measure rather than actual nuclear weapons. So we might enter a gradual process whereby by lifting sanctions against Iran, we could exchange Iran’s existing 60% enriched uranium for the destruction of its current stockpile. This would then limit Iran’s nuclear capability to the state where it takes “a very long time to produce enriched uranium.” This is the approach outlined in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, where Iran agrees to maintain a distance of 12 months from producing nuclear weapons while all parties adhere to the agreement.
“China Newsweek”: You have had many interactions with Iranian colleagues, do they still trust the United States?
Of course not. But the nuclear deal was never based on trust. As we just mentioned, the previous nuclear deal attempted to balance the situation, allowing Iranians to say, “If necessary, we can obtain nuclear weapons within 12 months.” Meanwhile, the United States could respond, “If they start trying to obtain nuclear weapons, we will have 12 months to stop them.”
This balance is neither pleasant nor easy to achieve, but it represents a mutual compromise.
In the ideal scenario, as Iran further integrates into global economic cooperation in the future, its demand for nuclear weapons would decrease, potentially leading to their eventual disappearance. Unfortunately, that step has not yet arrived.
Published on July 7, 2025, in Issue 1194 of China Newsweek magazine.
Hippel: Will Trump strike again against Iran?