2025年7月1日,越南共产党中央总书记苏林和多名越共中央政治局委员,来到首都河内市的行政服务中心,并深入福盛乡和西湖坊。面对基层政府工作人员,苏林要求他们从行政思维转向服务思维,从“尽力而为”转向“认真做事”,以赢得人民的信任与支持。
当天,经过大规模合并的越南各省市政府及省、乡(坊)两级政府体制正式开始运作。这标志着,自越共中央和国家机关进行大规模部门精简之后,在“边跑边谈”“有事就做”的飞速改革之中,越共中央总书记苏林“重整江山”的第二阶段也已经基本完成。
越通社将“重整江山”描述为“8年战略准备,8个月快速实施”。在这个阶段,越南全国由63个省市变为34个省市,690多个区级行政单位及近7000个乡坊成为历史,长期影响波及25万公职人员。
越南官方称,这场从2024年底开始的改革是越南国家机构迄今为止“规模最大、范围最广、最为彻底的一次变革”,“影响之深远,波及各层级、各领域、各地区,直达每一位国民”。距离2024年7月越共中央原总书记阮富仲在任内去世、8月苏林接任总书记职务,才过去不到一年时间,越南的这场大变革为何能高效推动?
5月5日,越南河内,(左起)越南国家主席梁强、越共中央总书记苏林、越南总理范明政出席越南第十五届国会第九次会议。图/视觉中国
省市合并与建立两级政府,是苏林成为越共中央总书记后,让外界瞩目的又一项重大政治举措。
苏林出身越南公安系统,2024年5月在公安部长任上当选越南国家主席,8月3日接替去世的阮富仲,出任越共中央总书记。同年10月,苏林不再兼任越南国家主席,由梁强继任,越共中央新的“四驾马车”最高领导层基本确立。
也是从2024年10月开始,苏林将阮富仲时代的“反腐败、反消极”运动扩大为“反腐败、反消极、反浪费”斗争,多名越共中央委员被问责。11月,越共中央、越南政府、国会开始大规模精简合并部门,中央政府部门合并后减少5个部,撤并越南国资委等直属机构。
到今年二三月间,随着中央政府各级部门重组接近尾声,酝酿已久的省级行政区合并被正式提上日程,并与撤销全部区级行政区、将地方政府从三级变为两级的改革同期进行。自7月1日开始,越南全国原有的63个省市减少为34个,比20世纪80年代革新开放之初的40个省市数量还要少。696个区级行政区全部撤销,1万多个乡坊也被合并为3321个。
按照越南官方说法,上述三场运动与改革,都是对阮富仲时代未尽工作的延续。2017年,阮富仲领导下的越共中央通过题为《关于继续朝着精干、高效方向推进政治体系组织机构革新》的决议(以下称“18号决议”)。
18号决议通过后,越南精简公务员超过7万人,并成立新机构国资委,管理原属于各部委的大型国企。不过,按照今天越南官方媒体的说法,18号决议的执行并不充分,机构重叠、上下臃肿的问题没有得到根本解决,局部措施没有达到效果。
其中的关键就是地方政府。
就任越共中央总书记之后不久,苏林就指出,不进行地方行政体制改革,中央的措施就难以上传下达,导致“党的很多政策落实缓慢,一些政策没有落实到位”。一个受到外界关注的细节是,虽然越南于2018年成立了国资委,但直到国资委被撤销,省级及以下政府都未进行同样的国企管理体制调整。而在本轮改革中,越南各省级党委和政府,都对照中央的机构精简,几乎“一一对应”地撤并了自己的部门。
实现地方行政体制的权力集中和上传下达,是本轮改革的核心目标。越南革新开放以来,为经济发展需要而不断分割增加的省市,难以适应新的形势需要。长期为越南地方政府提供政策建议的知名越南问题专家、新南威尔士大学荣休教授卡尔·塞耶对《中国新闻周刊》说,“发展空间”是越南地方经济发展的关键制约因素。现在,工业经济发达的省份,在合并后获得了更充足的人力资源和拓展空间。一些发达省份通过合并后,经济总量提升到全国前列,为后续改设直辖市创造了条件。
值得注意的是,这一轮改革中,各省人民委员会(省政府)的地位也从“单纯的行政管理机构”上升为“统一的行政中心”和“综合治理主体”。新修订的越南《地方政府组织法》中,人民委员会主席(省长)的独立职能从11项增加到23项,越通社称此为“明确体现指挥家作用”。
省级人民议会的作用则在一定程度上被弱化。
本轮改革的重要执行者、越南内政部长范氏清茶毫不讳言地指出:“以前,任何问题都必须等待人民委员会和人民议会的集体决定。兜圈子就意味着失去机会,不能及时为人民和企业解决问题。”
上传下达的问题,则主要在于区级体制。乡坊一级政府直接“面对人民”却缺乏治理授权;区级政府握有大量行政权限却不“贴近社区”。“撤区”只是改变该现象的第一步。胡志明市人民委员会主席(市长)阮文得就公开表示,7月1日开始的新体制只是该市乡坊的简单“加法”,更进一步的权力下放才刚刚开始。同一天,越南政府行政程序改革和权力下放指导委员会正式成立,政府总理范明政担任委员会主任。
越南领导层为何急于在此时“重整江山”?按照越南官方的说法,面对第四次工业革命及数字化转型压力,为了实现到2045年进入高收入国家行列,越南已经时不我待。内政部原副部长阮进廷分析称,越南正处于“人口黄金结构”时期,机遇稍纵即逝,如果等到“步入人口老龄化阶段”再改革,一切就都晚了。
外部分析则多强调,越共十四大计划于2026年初召开。十三大形成的越南领导层,2022年以来由于“反腐败、反消极”运动引发的大规模人事调整,已经发生了很大变动,中央政治局最初的18名成员中,有7人因对不同问题承担政治责任而辞职。此外,20多位中央委员受到不同程度处分,一些部委和省市的主要负责职位空缺达一年以上。
It is noteworthy that, prior to the provinces’ merger, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam had made significant adjustments to the provincial party secretaries by the end of 2024 and the first two months of 2025. According to incomplete statistics, among the 34 provincial administrative regions after the merger, at least 17 party secretaries are post-70s. Most of them were appointed as provincial party secretaries after January 2025 and remained in their positions during the merger. Among them, five are still under 50 years old this year, including So Lin, a native of Xingan and former senior member of the Ministry of Public Security, and Wu Hongwen, the secretary of the Tong Nai Provincial Committee.
Although some new administrative regions have older party secretaries, they have also been assigned young deputy secretaries. For example, Chen Guoqiang, the secretary of the Dǎn Bì Provincial Committee, was born in 1961 but has a “70s” deputy secretary, Chen Jinyong. Chen Jinyong was transferred from the position of Deputy Minister of Justice to become the deputy secretary of the original Yǒng Lóng Provincial Committee in January this year, and after the merger, he became Chen Guoqiang’s deputy.
In addition to Chen Jinyong, there are several different paths for the “70s” party secretaries who have been “added” due to the merger. Some older officials have been transferred to central government departments as deputy heads or will retire at the age of 70 as stipulated in the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam. Some provincial secretaries from Dong Lai, Quang Nam, Phu Tho, Phu Tho, and Ha Giang have retired early.
Meanwhile, some “70s” party secretaries have moved to the central level to hold key positions or serve as executive vice presidents. For example, Huang Zhongyong, the former Secretary of He Jing, was transferred to be the Editor-in-Chief of the Communist Party of China magazine; Duan Minghuan, the former Secretary of Ningping, was promoted to the Executive Vice President of the Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics; Chen Desheng, the former Secretary of Haiyang, was appointed as the Executive Deputy Commissioner of the Vietnamese Government; and Hu Wenyan, the former Secretary of Jau Lai, was promoted to the Executive Deputy Minister of the Ministry of National Education.
Compared to high-level officials, the placement of grassroots officials and ordinary public servants represents a larger social and economic issue.
According to official statistics from Vietnam, the country’s cadre and various public officials total approximately 2.5 million people nationwide. This round of central and local government reforms involves about 250,000 individuals. In the long term, this could save hundreds of trillions of Vietnamese dong in government expenses. However, in the short term, issuing early retirement incentive compensations could become a heavy burden for local governments.
By the end of June, local governments in Vietnam had “cut” around 20,000 employees, with many provinces having only a few hundred officials retire early. The process of mass layoffs has just begun. However, Yen An, a major economic province in the north-central region, has made rapid progress. By mid-June, over 2600 public officials, including several departmental level officials, had left their posts, with more than 2300 retiring early.
According to official data, by 2025 alone, these individuals will need Yen An Province to provide about 3 trillion Vietnamese dong in compensation. The assessment of the other more than 100 who are retiring early and those placed on “temporary leave” adds up to another expense of about 500 billion Vietnamese dong.
In other words, the human resource cost increase due to the streamlining reforms in Yen An Province this year amounts to at least 3.5 trillion Vietnamese dong (approximately 960 million Chinese yuan), while the province’s fiscal budget revenue for 2024 was only 25 trillion Vietnamese dong (approximately 6860 million Chinese yuan). Official media have also admitted that Yen An faces some difficulties in determining how to finance the implementation of these funds.
Currently, the Ministry of Finance has submitted proposals to the government, intending to supplement the central budget with 61 trillion Vietnamese dong (approximately 167.4 billion Chinese yuan) for the distribution of related subsidies. The Ministry of Home Affairs expects that the total expenditure will exceed one trillion Vietnamese dong.
Vietnamese media point out that, apart from compensation issues, some officials support the reforms superficially but change their attitude once they “involve themselves and their provinces or units.”
塞耶分析称,越南的政治文化是“重视平衡”,但改革不可能做到“绝对平衡”。
例如,有些省份在合并中采取了“省名沿用原A省,省会设在原B省”的模式,但也并不绝对。太平省和兴安省合并,定名为兴安省,省会也设在兴安。合并前,兴安省人口约120万人,太平省约180万人。
越通社在评论中指出,这不是“谁占谁”的问题,而是“团结力量发展”。“产生失去本省名称的念头,是人之常情,但国家愿景、国家最高利益,高于一切地方思想。”
自出任越共中央总书记以来,苏林每次进行重大斗争或改革,都会撰写一篇新的署名文章。在省市合并和两级政府改革成形之际,苏林于6月下旬发表了题为《团结的力量》的新署名文章。
文章提到了改革中出现的“面和心不和”和“地方本位主义”问题。苏林用越南过去反殖民斗争失败的教训,以及外国一些政党政权崩溃的例子,说明“团结关乎生死”。“即便只是局部的团结受损,也足以削弱整体力量,甚至摧毁革命成果。”他强调,“只有从上到下、从内到外在思想上和行动上统一起来,才能胜利完成机构改革任务。”
这次大刀阔斧的改革,本身的政治目标就包括消灭各种“团团伙伙”,实现团结。越南国会办公厅原副主任阮诗勇就在官方媒体上表示,这次改革的关键在于“朝着有效的方向重组权力”。
对于越南各级地方干部来说,这次改革同样是一次对他们是否服从新领导层重大决策的“测验”。
苏林在署名文章中强调,全体党员干部要严守纪律,对于党内决定“一旦达成共识,就要团结一致、认真落实,绝不允许出现派系主义、地方主义”。
6月下旬,越南国会通过了新版《干部和公务员法》,自7月1日起施行。法案严禁干部和公职人员逃避责任、制造派系斗争和分裂、擅自辞职离职,以及损害国家和单位声誉。
7月6日,越南官方媒体《劳动报》发表题为《重整江山——从历史传承到国家发展新时代》的评论文章,回顾了越南历史上知名君主黎圣宗重划行政边界、阮朝明命皇帝统合南北等改革事迹。文章说,黎圣宗和明命帝不畏保守势力阻挠,坚定追求国家强盛,改革取得了成功。如今,要实现越南政府提出的一系列愿景,“需要同样的政治决心,需要整个政治体系和全体人民的共识,以克服旧机制和利益集团的障碍”。
发于2025.7.14总第1195期《中国新闻周刊》杂志
杂志标题:越南“重整江山”进行时
(caoran@chinanews.com.