In recent years, the rise of conservative right-wing forces in Japan has been a phenomenon of heightened international concern. During the Japanese Senate election on the 20th, an emerging political force, known as the “Party of the People,” which advocates for “Japanese priority” and adopts radical right-wing populist stances and efficient digital mobilization strategies, rapidly rose to prominence. Not only did it disrupt the tranquility of traditional Japanese political landscapes, but it also achieved a remarkable leap from 1 to 15 seats in the National Diet through winning young voters and eroding support from traditional right-wing forces. In just five years, it developed from a web community into a crucial force in the National Diet, becoming an undeniable “key minority” political force. Its development trajectory will profoundly influence the future direction of Japanese politics.
The Party of the People was established in April 2020, derived from the vaccine conspiracy theories during the COVID-19 pandemic. Its predecessor was the YouTube channel “Party DIY,” founded by former self-defense personnel and local councilor Shingo Seki. At its inception, the Party of the People widely spread its ideas through social media, creating issues such as anti-vaccine and anti-globalization to attract the younger online demographic. With highly incendiary slogans like “Japanese first” and “Return to the prosperity of Showa Era,” it precisely captured the public’s discontent with the economic situation and anxiety about the nation’s future. In Japan, where economic stagnation and increasing wealth gap have led to a large number of young voters and disillusioned with traditional politics, these propositions attracted a significant number of young voters and those disillusioned with traditional politics. In terms of organizational structure, the Party of the People maintains its operations through a “monthly membership fee system” (ranging from 500 to 4000 yen), granting members (members) different political rights, creating an image of a “party within a phone,” breaking the monopoly of elite discourse, and establishing a “participatory democracy” model. Through online mobilization, it effortlessly raised hundreds of millions of yen for election funds, demonstrating exceptional organizational and mobilization capabilities.
In the 2022 Japanese Senate election, the Party of the People triumphed at the outset, securing 3 seats in the proportional representation district.
33%的得票率斩获1席，跻身“合法政党”。其支持率从近乎零飙升至7%，一举超越部分主流在野党，震惊日本政坛。在去年的众议院选举中，参政党在比例代表区获得3席，国会席位增至4席。在今年6月的东京都议会选举中首夺3席，成功进入首都政治圈。而在20日的参议院选举中，参政党共推出55名候选人，最终获得14议席，成为可以左右国会法案通过、无法被忽视的“关键少数力量”。
升级版的极端右翼4.0
与日本的传统保守右翼势力相比，参政党的政治理念更激进、更极端。有分析人士指出，综合参政党近年提出的煽动性政策口号，如果将战前的日本军国主义称为右翼1.0、战后自民党成立时的保守势力称为右翼2.0、 近来年比较活跃的“日本会议”和“加油日本” 等新兴右翼势力称为右翼3.0，那么参政党可谓是极端右翼4.0升级版。
在意识形态上，日本传统保守右翼势力虽也主张修改和平宪法（尤其第九条），推动“正常国家化”，但基本接受战后民主框架，避免直接否定东京审判。参政党则是彻底否定战后体制，提出《新日本国宪法构想案》，主张恢复“天皇主权制”，定义日本为“天皇统有的君民一体国家”，天皇可直接任命首相、批准条约。还要求将《教育敕语》、神道教纳入必修课程，明确回归战前意识形态。
在民族主义表现形上，日本传统保守右翼势力虽强调“文化民族主义”，通过推动爱国教育等符号化行动强化民族自豪和认同，但在经济上支持全球化与国际协调。
The political party, known as the Progressive Liberal Party (PLP), advocates for “Japanese priority” and promotes xenophobic nationalism and ancestryism. It holds anti-immigration stances, intensifies control over land and the influx of foreign populations, and stipulates that a citizen must have one parent Japanese, speak Japanese as their mother tongue, and love Japan.
In terms of support groups and mobilization strategies, the traditional conservative right-wing forces in Japan primarily target the middle-aged and elderly population (ages 50 and above). They rely on traditional voting blocs such as agricultural organizations and shrine networks to mobilize, while the PLP focuses on young voters, even successfully attracting younger conservatives from the Liberal Democratic Party. The support group is characterized by its youthfulness, urbanization, and opposition to established institutions. The mobilization strategy has also bypassed traditional media channels, directly engaging with voters through live broadcasts, short videos, and voice-activated electronic magazines, pioneering a “digital populism” model.
Economic hardships have been crucial soil for the rise of the PLP, representing a new wave of extreme right-wing forces in Japan. After more than 30 years of economic downturn, soaring prices, widening wealth gap, difficulties for young people finding employment, and confusion about the future, the PLP’s calls for returning to the prosperity of the昭和时代 and restricting foreign capital and immigration resonate with some Japanese citizens’ desire to change the status quo and regain their past glory.
Moreover, changes in the political landscape in Japan have provided opportunities for the rise of the PLP. Long-term ruling by traditional parties like the Liberal Democratic Party has led to policy innovation and vitality being lacking, neglecting core public needs leading to a decline in trust among the public. In contrast, the PLP presents itself with a fresh perspective, breaking away from the monopoly of traditional political elites and leveraging digital tools to interact with the public, creating a sense of participation and attracting a large number of disillusioned voters who are dissatisfied with traditional politics.
Furthermore, the rising conservatism within Japan, fueled by nationalist sentiments, makes it easier for the extremist nationalist ideas promoted by emerging right-wing forces like the PLP to spread.
在此次参议院选举中，本非选举议题的 “外国人政策”在参政党炒作下迅速成为选举焦点，由此可见一斑。
参政党的崛起对日本现有政治格局产生了多方面的冲击。在传统的日本政坛，自民党长期占据主导地位，与公明党组成的执政联盟把控着政治走向。然而，参政党的出现打破了这种相对稳定的局面，使得日本议会结构日益碎片化。特别是在当前自民党和公明党执政联盟在众参两院均处于“少数执政”的状态下，参政党可在国防预算、修宪等议题上与自民党交易，成为影响法案通过的“决定性力量”。同时，其政治实力的增强将很可能推动日本政治进一步向右转，加剧国内政治的保守化倾向。
此外，参政党的崛起也在日本国内加剧社会分裂。该党宣扬的“日本人优先”等排外思想，在社交媒体和现实生活中引发了针对外国人的负面舆论和歧视行为，网络上充斥着“外国人在日本享受超国民待遇”等谣言。尽管日本官方出面辟谣并列举数据用事实说话，但仍难化解部分日本人的对立情绪，存在矛盾激化的可能。而在国际上，参政党的崛起同样将产生严重负面影响，其极端民族主义和排外主张，很可能加剧日本与周边国家的紧张关系，给东亚地区的和平稳定带来新的不稳定因素。
日本参政党这一极端右翼势力的崛起，代表了数字时代右翼的变异。
It packages exclusionary agendas with participatory democracy, replaces traditional organizations with online mobilization, transforms the sense of loss among youth into political fuel. It is essentially “anti-establishment conservatism” born in the tide of globalization, which not only challenges the monopoly position of the Liberal Democratic Party’s conservative faction but also propels Japanese politics towards identity politics and populist mobilization. This represents a profound change in the political ecology of Japan. As the influence of the participating parties continues to expand, it is worth paying close attention to the direction of Japanese politics and how it will evolve in relation to regional and global contexts.