2025年7月28日、29日，朝鲜中央通讯社连续刊发朝鲜最高领导人金正恩的妹妹、劳动党中央委员会副部长金与正的谈话，两次谈话分别针对朝韩关系和朝美关系新动向。
在针对朝韩关系的谈话中，金与正对韩国新总统李在明一系列缓和半岛紧张局势的举措评价不高，称韩方幻想朝韩领导人对话是“做白日梦”，“没有任何事情和问题与韩国坐在一起讨论”。
针对朝美关系，金与正的态度有所不同。提及美国总统特朗普近期表现出和金正恩会面的积极意愿，金与正说，朝方的态度是“对之（特朗普的表态）不想赋予任何意义”，“只是有必要提醒一下，眼下是2025年，而不是过去的2018年或2019年”。
2025年和2018年、2019年上一轮朝美接触时，有何不同？金与正用不少篇幅反复强调：现在朝鲜有了“不可逆转的拥核国地位及其能力”，这一点不容否认。不过，金与正也提出，朝鲜有意愿就无核化以外的问题和美国接触。
“我不想否认我们国家元首和美国现任总统之间的个人关系并不坏的事实。”金与正称，“两个拥核国家相持不下、走向对抗，这决不利于彼此。该有起码的判断力承认这点，那么，最好出于这一新思维方式寻找别的接触点。”
对于金与正此番谈话，韩联社评论道，这是在美国总统特朗普及白宫官员多次表示愿意和朝鲜进行无核化谈判后进行的回应，即朝美之间现在不会进行无核化谈判，但可以进行其他目的的谈判。
“First, make friends, then discuss matters.”
In June 2018, in Singapore, Kim Jong Un and Trump reached a four-point consensus during their first meeting: to establish a new relationship between North Korea and the United States, to jointly strive for a lasting and stable peace mechanism on the peninsula, to achieve complete denuclearization of the peninsula, and to find and transfer remains of prisoners and missing soldiers from the Korean War.
Among these, North Korea’s willingness to gradually abandon its nuclear weapons and close its nuclear facilities in exchange for the US lifting sanctions was the most crucial issue. However, at the second “Kim-Trump summit” held in Hanoi, Vietnam in February 2019, due to Trump suddenly demanding that North Korea close another “secret nuclear facility” at the last minute to secure sanctions relief, negotiations broke up unhappily. Subsequently, Trump and Kim Jong Un had a “surprise meeting” in the DMZ in June 2019, but it was evidently not enough to push forward with new consensuses between North Korea and the US.
Six years later, Kim emphasized in this conversation that North Korea is “open to any options for maintaining its current national status,” and stated that North Korea and the US should “not move towards confrontation.” Analysts believe that this statement resonates with the content of the “Singapore consensus” between North Korea and the US, which includes establishing a new relationship between North Korea and the US, and creating a lasting and stable peace mechanism on the peninsula.
“The direction of North Korea is very clear,” said Mark Barrie, the founding director of the Asia-Pacific Institute for Peace Studies in New York, who participated in the six-party talks and has met with senior North Korean officials multiple times. He pointed out to China Newsweek that Kim Jong Un realized during previous meetings that Trump is “unreliable, dishonest, and only seeks immediate benefits.”
Therefore, in the face of Trump’s repeated statements since 2025 that he is “willing to talk with Kim Jong Un on denuclearization,” North Korea has taken up the position of a “nuclear-armed state” and forced Trump to sidestep the most desired goal of “complete denuclearization” of North Korea, instead seeking to meet with Kim Jong Un through topics previously reached preliminary consensus on, such as establishing working relations between the two sides.
On the surface, once both parties can reach new consensus on these issues, Trump could potentially revive the “Kim-Trump meeting,” announce his diplomatic victory, and achieve a “win-win” situation with Kim Jong Un. However, although the US side cannot admit to having nuclear weapons during this process, once Trump and Kim Jong Un sit opposite each other, this scenario would become an equal dialogue between the two nuclear-armed states.
Trump is well aware of this. Currently, the most important expert on North Korean issues within Trump’s team, Allison Hooker, currently serving as Deputy Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy at the US Department of State, has repeatedly pointed out that denuclearization is the bottom line for US-North Korea engagement. Hooker also emphasized that exchanging “denuclearization” for US lifting sanctions is already the “best deal” that North Korea can obtain.
In her remarks, Kim Jong Un can be seen as a direct response to Hooker’s viewpoint. She stated that if the US continues to place the personal relationship between the “heads of state” of North Korea and their denuclearization goals on the same line, it is a deception against North Korea; if the US persists in pushing for the “failed past” of North Korea’s denuclearization, then “the meeting between North Korea and the US can only remain at the level of the US’s ‘hopes’.”
It seems that this round of “remote negotiations” between North Korea and the US has reached a dead end.
韩国前国会议员、前青瓦台国政状况室室长李光宰曾对《中国新闻周刊》说，朝美谈判的问题就在于，敌对情绪不可能在一朝一夕得到缓解，而且双方的文化也不同，“依照东方的文化，我们可能先交朋友，然后再去谈具体的事情，但是西方国家会先谈具体的内容，再确定能否成为朋友”。
6年前，正是因为特朗普想在两次“金特会”上毕其功于一役，通过恩威并施立即实现朝鲜全面弃核，才导致朝美谈判迅速破裂。如今，美方的公开表态虽然不变，但不少分析人士都认为，在朝鲜核武库已经“倍增”、美军一次打击无法彻底摧毁朝鲜核能力的情况下，“先交朋友，再谈事情”，最后走向半岛无核化，或许才是更好的路径。
一个细节是，今年6月，有美国媒体曾曝出特朗普想向金正恩致亲笔信，但在通过朝美联络常用的“纽约渠道”（朝鲜驻纽约联合国代表团）递送时，被朝方“拒收”。白宫并未否认此事，而是表示特朗普“对互换亲笔信依然持开放态度”。
有分析人士指出，这件事至少意味着两点。首先，朝美之间的“纽约渠道”仍在正常运作，能够沟通一般事务。其次，特朗普已经意识到，简单地通过工作层级渠道向金正恩“发信”，没有给予朝方足够的尊重，朝美之间需要更加对等的接触。
“金特会”能否重现？
不过，随着国际局势变化，“金特会”能否重现，并不完全取决于当事双方。巴里指出，当前最重要的变量因素有两个，一是金正恩何时和李在明政府重启高层接触，二是俄乌冲突是否会真的走向停战。
The second factor will determine whether Kim Jong Un decides it’s necessary to adjust his current foreign policy strategy. The first factor is largely influenced by Lee Jae-myung’s policies towards North Korea.
Since taking office, Lee Jae-myung has seemingly taken a series of measures to ease the situation on the Korean Peninsula, but this does not necessarily mean he has a strong desire to promote a meeting between North and South Korean leaders. In fact, when Lee Jae-myung was elected president, Won Ji-sik, who was his two-term campaign team advisor for Northeast Asia affairs, told China Newsweek: “The relationship between North and South Korea has reached its lowest point under Yoon Suk-yeol’s administration, and it’s unlikely to suddenly improve. Moreover, we believe that North Korea is currently focusing on strengthening relations with Russia, and there have been no talks between the US and North Korea. Under these circumstances, the new government’s unification policy needs to be controlled at a pace. At this stage, the new government might be focused on efforts to resume dialogue and contact with North Korea, and take measures to gradually restore mutual trust.”
Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun held idealistic attitudes towards North-South relations; Moon Jae-in had the dream of settling in North Korea after unification; while Li Jae-myung, born from the bottom of Korean society and having no ties with North Korea, tended more towards pragmatism in handling North-South relations, choosing to “control the speed” not surprisingly.
In a speech released on July 28, Kim Jong Un also pointed out the “ambiguity” of the Lee Jae-myung administration: “On the surface, they talk about alleviating tensions on the Korean Peninsula and improving relations between North and South Korea, but their blind obedience to the US-North Korea alliance and their intention to fight to the end against North Korea are just as much as those of their predecessors.”
Although claiming to have nothing to say with South Korea, in reality, Kim Jong Un still raised a question further testing South Korea’s sincerity during their conversation: US military exercises. She stated, “The world will soon witness the continuous large-scale joint military exercises outside our southern borders.”
有分析指出，这是朝鲜在本轮“隔空谈判”中对韩美提出的第一个实质性条件：想梦回2018年、2019年，就必须先拿出当时“暂停军演”的友好态度。8月中旬一年一度的韩美“乙支自由护盾”演习，是否进行、规模如何，就是第一重考验。
对此，李在明政府给予了积极但模糊的回应。韩国新任统一部长官郑东泳在朝中社发布上述谈话数小时后即表示，将向李在明提议“调整”韩美军演。他强调，前总统尹锡悦执政时期的韩美军演方针“不会延续”，但并未明确将缩减规模还是延期举行。
多位韩美分析人士对《中国新闻周刊》指出，考虑到朝韩各有自己的政治议程，且金与正已经将朝鲜领导人10月前往韩国庆州出席亚太经合组织领导人非正式会议称为韩方的“白日梦”，双方关系最快也要等到2026年才会取得积极进展，而且未必如2018年初那样，在恢复接触后迅速对外公开。
：曹然（caoran@chinanews.com.